Contracts and Electronic Agents by Kis, Sabrina
Digital Commons @ Georgia Law
LLM Theses and Essays Student Works and Organizations
8-1-2004
Contracts and Electronic Agents
Sabrina Kis
University of Georgia School of Law
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Works and Organizations at Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in LLM Theses and Essays by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. Please share how you have
benefited from this access For more information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.
Repository Citation
Kis, Sabrina, "Contracts and Electronic Agents" (2004). LLM Theses and Essays. 25.
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/stu_llm/25
  
CONTRACTS AND ELECTRONIC AGENTS: WHEN COMMERCIAL PRAGMATISM AND 
LEGAL THEORIES DIVERGE. 
by 
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(Under the Direction of Robert Brussack) 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the formation of contracts concluded by electronic agents both in 
the European Union and the United States. Technology is in constant evolution and the possibilities offered by 
electronic agents today are far from the ones that could be developed tomorrow. Thus, law faces a permanent 
challenge to adapt itself to these changes. This paper aims to show that the existing principles do not provide an 
appropriate legal frame for this new type of contract. In addition, since legislatures have attempted to regulate this 
new way of doing business, this thesis analyzes the possible development of a new set of rules. To achieve that goal, 
a just balance between protecting users and ensuring the freedom necessary to businesses needs to be found. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Electronic commerce may be defined as the ability to conduct business via electronic 
network and to use the Internet as a commercial medium. 1 Since the 1990’s, electronic 
commerce has grown rapidly, and the use of computer technology has enhanced the 
possibilities offered. However, with the benefits of electronic commerce come downsides. For 
instance, the wide range of information and choices available made more difficult for people 
to search for information or to find relevant Web sites and data. New tools may remedy to this 
kind of problem. Technology has been developed that enables individuals to use electronic 
agents to make purchases or to conclude agreements.  
 Many definitions of electronic agents have been given. Although they have been 
described as “a software thing that know [sic] how to do things that you could probably do 
yourself if you had the time,”2 a more technical definition would be to identify an electronic 
agent as a “component of software and/or hardware which is capable of acting exactly in 
order to accomplish tasks on behalf of its user.” 3 To lawyers, the term “agent” suggests the 
application of the law of agents and principals, but this paper will defend the proposition that 
the law of agents and principals should not necessarily govern the relationship between users 
and their electronic agents. 
 Realizing the importance of electronic commerce for their economies, many nations 
have attempted to regulate this new way of doing business and to find a just balance between 
                                              
1 See Ling Bin, An Investigation of Distributed Agent-Based Systems in Electronic Commerce,  available at 
http://maotai.dcs.st-and.ac.uk/research/mres_dsm.htm (last visited June 8, 2004). 
2 Bjorn Hermans, Intelligent Software Agents on the Internet: An Inventory of Current ly Offered Functionality in 
the Information Society and a Prediction of (Near -)Future Developments  (1996), available at 
http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue2_3/ch_123/index.html (last visited  June 8, 2004). 
3 SYED MAHBUBUR RAHMAN & ROBERT J. BIGNALL, INTERNET COMMERCE & SOFTWARE AGENTS: CASES, 
TECHNOLOGIES AND OPPORTUNITIES 76 (2001).  
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consumer protection and economic freedom. Today, the validity of contracts concluded by 
electronic agents has been generally recognized. Nonetheless, many issues regarding their use 
remain. This paper aims to explain an important subset of these issues and to describe 
possible approaches. The paper will focus on the electronic formation of contracts and on 
possible remedies available to the parties in the event of unwanted transactions. 
 International regulation of electronic contracts remains limited. This paper, therefore, 
will focus on national law, and in particular on the law of the United States and of France, a 
common law nation and a civil law nation. By comparing the approaches of these two 
important modern legal systems, the paper aims to achieve a certain comprehensiveness in its 
analysis of electronic agents. 
 First, because of the novelty of electronic agents, the paper will offer a description and 
detailed definition. Part II of the paper then will focus on the validity and formation of the 
contracts concluded by electronic agents. And Part III will explain some of the legal 
consequences flowing from this new type of contract.  
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CHAPTER 2 
DEFINITION OF ELECTRONIC AGENTS 
 
A. Technical Features 
 
There is no single definition of an electronic agent. Beyond the basic recognition that 
an electronic agent is a “software thing,”4 there are almost as many definitions available as 
articles written on the topic. 5 It is nonetheless possible to find a common understanding and 
agreed-upon characteristics that shape a technical definition of an electronic agent.  
 
1. Introduction to the World of Robots 
 
A number of agent-based systems6 have been developed and this number will probably 
increase in the next decades. 7 Not all of these systems are relevant here, but it is interesting to 
note that different types of agents8 already coexist in cyberspace and that the possibilities of 
development are numerous.9 Thus, while researching electronic agents, one could come to 
read about “robots” or “bots”10 (also referred to as knowbots, softbots or taskbots11), 
                                              
4 Bin, supra note 1. 
5 See RAHMN ET AL., supra note 3,  at 76; see also STUART J. RUSSEL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE : A  MODERN APPROACH 31 (1995). 
6 See Bin, supra note 1. 
7 Id. 
8 See Stephen T. Middlebrook & John Muller, Thoughts on Bots: The Emerging Law of Electronic Agents, 56 
BUS. LAW. 341, 343-44 (2000). 
9 See Bin, supra note 1. 
10 Middlebrook & Muller, supra  note 8, at 343. 
11 See Emily M. Weitzenboeck, Electronic Agents and the formation of Contracts, 4 (Published in the 
International Journal of Law and Information Technology, Vol.9 No.3, 204-34), available at 
http://folk.uio.no/emilyw/documents/EMILY%20-%20Version%2019%20August%20&%20source.pdf (last 
visit ed June 8, 2004). 
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autonomous agents12 or other intelligent agents. 13 Autonomous agents can accomplish many 
different tasks. Some of them will search the web and gather information needed by their 
users (data mining bots14); others will be able to index millions of web pages (web 
crawlers15). An exhaustive list of the robots currently in use would be too long and is not the 
purpose of this paper. 16 
If all robots are software, does it follow that every software application can be seen as 
an electronic agent? Experts17 have tried to find attributes which, when present in software, 
make it “[behave] like an autonomous agent.”18 One of the most comprehensive theories 
developed 19 distinguishes between “strong” and “weak” agency. To be characterized as an 
agent at all, software must possess several fundamental attributes that correspond to the 
“weak notion.”20 Robots may also possess additional auxiliary features (the “strong notion” 21) 
but need not possess these features to qualify as electronic “agents.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
12 See Middlebrook & Muller, supra note 8, at note 3 (quoting Stan Franklin & Art Graesser, Is it An Agent or 
Just a Program? A Taxonomy for Autonomous Agents (1996)). 
13 See Middlebrook & Muller, supra  note 8, at note 4.  
14 Id., at 343. 
15 Id. 
16 BotSpot maintains such a list, available at http://www.botspot.com/search (last visited on June 8, 2004). 
17 Professors Stan Franklin and Art Graesser are two such experts. See Middlebrook et al., supra note 8, at note 
13. 
18 Middlebrook & Muller, supra  note 8, at 345. 
19 See Wooldridge and Jennings, Intelligent Agents: Theory and Practice, Knowledge Engineering Review Vol. 
10 No.2, June 1995 (Cambridge University Press: 1995).  
20 See id.; see also  Bin, supra note 1. 
21 See Wooldridge & Jennings, supra note 19; see also  Bin, supra note 1. 
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The following table shows the four fundamental attributes.22  
 
Property Description 
Reactivity The agent perceives and reacts to changes in 
the environment 
Autonomy The agent exercises control over its actions 
and operate without direct intervention of 
humans or others. 
Persistence The agent is a continually running process, 
which is not changed capriciously. 
Ability to communicate The agent communicates with people, other 
bots and its environment. 
 
Autonomy is the key characteristic in distinguishing electronic agents from software in 
general.23 The “strong notion” of electronic agents comprises additional properties usually 
associated with humans. Some “strong notion” writers24 emphasize “mentalist” 25 concepts, 
such as beliefs or intentions; others26 refer to human-like attributes, such as emotions.  
The following table shows some of the auxiliary attributes27 of autonomous agents. 
The list is not exhaustive. Other properties could be used to refer to an autonomous agent. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
22 Middlebrook et al., supra note 8, at 345; see also Wooldridge et al., supra note 19. 
23 See RUSSELL & NORVIG , ARTIFICIAL  INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN APPROACH 35 (Prentice Hall  : New Jersey 
1995). 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Bates, 1994, Ba tes et al, 1992 quoted by Wooldridge & Jennings, supra note 19. 
27 Wooldridge & Jennings, supra note 19; see also Bin, supra note 1.  
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Property Description 
Mobility The agent can transport itself from one 
machine to another while preserving its 
internal state. 
Reasoning The agent can change its behavior based on 
current knowledge or past experiences. 
Benevolence The agent does not have conflicting goals 
Veracity The agent will not knowingly communicate 
false information 
Ability to plan The agent is able to choose between different 
courses of action in order to achieve its 
goals. 
Learning The agent may accumulate knowledge based 
on past experience and subsequently modify 
its behavior. 
 
 
2. Autonomous Agents Used for Contracting 
 
In the simplest versions of electronic contracting, there is no need for autonomous 
electronic agents:28 Software programs simply issue standard offers and record acceptances 
from buyers. Electronic agents, however, can be “active participant[s] in the trading 
process.” 29 Machines that are autonomous and that learn through experience30 can manifest 
behavior associated with free will.31 
There is every reason to expect that electronic agents will become more and more 
sophisticated, reaching imaginable, but remarkable levels of autonomy later in the century, 
but electronic agents already are used in the process of contracting. To understand exactly at 
                                              
28 Tom Allen & Robin Widdison, Can Computers Make Contracts , 9 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 25, 26. (1996) 
29 Id., at 26. 
30 See supra tables pp.4-5. 
31 Allen & Widdison., supra  note 28, at 27. 
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which stage an autonomous agent can be used, the Consumer Buying Behavior Model was 
created.32 There are six basic stages in a consumer’s buying process. These stages are need 
identification, product brokering, merchant brokering, negotiation, purchase/delivery, and 
product service and  evaluation. First, the individual or buyer recognizes a need for something. 
Second, several products are presented, tailored to the buyer’s desires. Third, different sellers 
are identified. Fourth, after product and merchant are identified, the terms of the contract are 
negotiated. Fifth, the product is purchased and delivered, and the company may offer post-
sale service. Finally, the buyer evaluates the experience. According to experts, 33 today’s 
autonomous agents could be used at the first four stages of the model. These stages 
correspond to the steps leading to the conclusion of the contract and could be handled by one 
or several agents. Moreover, it is not impossible to imagine that in the future electronic agents 
will be able to take care of every step of the process without the intervention of a human 
being. Agreements then will be concluded by the electronic agents and not only through 
them.34  
Kasbah35 is one of the many agent-based systems available on the Internet.36 Users of 
Kasbah can create agents to help buy or sell a particular product. The seller registers his 
product with the Kasbah server via a computer interface, 37 and buyers go to the server to look 
for items. Users can develop buying or selling strategies before sending their agents into the 
market place. The Kasbah agents intervene at the fourth stage of the Consumer Buying 
Behavior Model38-- negotiation. Sellers’ agents “know” the seller’s bottom price and the price 
                                              
32 See Maes et al., Agents that Buy and Sell: Transforming Commerce as We Know It, Communications of the 
ACM, March 1999, Vol. 42, No.3, pp. 81-91. 
33 Id. 
34 See Ian R. Kerr, Providing for Autonomous Electronic Devices in the Uniform Electronic Commerce Act 18, 
available at http://www.law.ualberta.ca/alri/ulc/current/ekerr.pdf (last visited June 8, 2004). 
35 See Moukas et al., Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: An MIT Media Laboratory Perspective 3, available 
at http://web.media.mit.edu/~moux/papers/icec98.pdf (last visited June 8, 2004). 
36 See for instance Vendio.com (former AuctionWatch.com), Teksell.com, Ebay.com or Ebreviate.com (last 
visited June 8, 2004). 
37 See Bin, supra note 1, at 10. 
38 See Maes et al., supra note 32.  
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the seller would like to have, and they can be equipped with some bargaining tactics, 
including how and when to lower the price during the negotiation. Buyers’ agents offer bids 
to sellers’ agents that can answer in the affirmative or negative until a deal is reached. 
The Kasbah agents, as described, focus only on the element of price. It is not 
impossible, however, to imagine electronic agents following more complex instructions. Let’s 
assume, for instance, that two individuals, John and Brad, do not know each other. John wants 
to buy a new car, but he is too busy and does not have time to surf the Internet to find the best 
car at the best price. He therefore releases his electronic agent into cyberspace with 
instructions to purchase the car of his dreams. To be sure that the electronic agent knows what 
to do, John gives the agent a specified range of prices (the bottom price and the ideal price) 
and other terms such as the brand (a BMW), the color (red is better but John would be okay 
with a black or blue car; on the other hand, he specifies that he refuses to buy a yellow or 
green car), the year, etc. He also might instruct his agent that if the model is more recent he is 
ready to pay more. On the other side, the seller, Brad, is the owner of a used BMW. He was 
promoted recently and wishes to buy a new Mercedes. Brad does not want to waste his time 
posting an advertisement and selecting the best buyer. He decides, therefore, to use a software 
agent that he instructs to sell his car within a specified range of prices and other terms 
(delivery, warranty, etc.) to the highest bidder. Brad and John will never discuss the terms of 
the contract together. Their agents, after interacting with other agents to find the best deal, 
will arrange the sale of the used BMW. In this rather simple hypothetical, the agent has more 
instructions to deal with and may be able to initiate and conclude the transaction by itself.  
As has been noted by others,39 
[a]gents will no doubt be employed to assist human interaction 
through the various stages of a transaction from product and 
merchant brokering through to negotiation, sale, distribution and 
payment. It is not unreasonable to predict that, in time, agent 
                                              
39 Kerr, supra note 34, at 19. 
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technology will become sufficiently sophisticated to perform many 
if not all of these sorts of tasks without human oversight or 
intervention. 40   
 
 A company, for instance, can use an electronic agent to manage its office supplies. In 
such a case, the electronic agent monitors the stock and when the stock fell to a certain level, 
the agent selects the best offer from several suppliers. It orders the amount the company 
needs. The electronic agent, without the company or its human employees even knowing 
about it, would perform the whole transaction. 41 
   
B. Statutory Definition of Electronic Agents  
 
As we have seen, experts have tried to arrive at a definition of electronic agents based 
on the technical characteristics and skills of agents. They have had some difficulties in finding 
a generally accepted definition. This may be because autonomous agents are still in their early 
development and it is hard to foresee what exactly they will be able to do. It is axiomatic that 
law lags technology. It should come as no surprise, then, that our legal systems have only 
begun to address the issues peculiar to electronic agents, and the law’s response to the rapidly 
increasing autonomy of these agents remains especially undeveloped. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
40 Id. 
41 See Jean-François Lerouge, The Use of  Electronic Agents Questioned under Contractual Law: Suggested 
Solutions on a European and American level , 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 406. (1998) 
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1. American Legislation 
 
a. The UETA & E-SIGN: Confusing Differences 
  
i. The UETA 
A natural starting point in describing American law is the Uniform Electronic 
Transactions Act (UETA).42 The UETA is not a federal statute enforceable by the courts. It 
was drafted and adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws in the hope that it would be enacted by state legislatures.43 Nothing obliged the states to 
enact it, but as of the beginning of 2004, it has been enacted by 46 States.44 
Drafted in the summer of 1999, the eleven-page Act deals with digital signatures, 
electronic contracts, automated transactions, and transactions between parties when both 
parties have agreed to conduct transactions by electronic means. This paper focuses on the 
UETA provisions governing automated transactions.45 The Act creates a set of rules that 
apply to electronic agents. The first important provision is the definition of an electronic 
agent.46 The Act defines an electronic agent as “a computer program or an electronic or other 
automated means used independently to initiate an action or respond to electronic records or 
performances in whole or in part, without review or action by an individual.”47   The UETA’s 
                                              
42 UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT (UETA) (1999), available at http://www. 
law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ulc.htm (last visited June 9, 2004). 
43 NCCUSL is a non-profit organization created in 1892. Its purpose is to enhance the uniformity of law by 
drafting model state laws and encourage states to pass them. See National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform States Laws website, available at  http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/aboutus.asp  (last visited May 24, 
2004). 
44 As of May 24, 2004, UETA had been adopted in several cases with non-uniform provisions in 46 states and 
introduces in 2004 in the states of Alaska and South Carolina.  For more information, see 
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts -fs-UETAasp (last visited May 24, 2004). 
45 UETA §2. An “automated transaction” is defined as “a transaction conducted or performed, in whole or in 
part, by electronic means or electronic records, in which the acts or records of one or both parties are not 
reviewed by an individual in the ordinary course in forming a contract, performing under an existing contract, or 
fulfilling an obligation required by the transaction.” 
46 UETA §2(6).  
47 Id.  
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drafters,48 despite the use of the term “electronic agent,” viewed current “agents” as tools of 
their users. The drafters appreciated, however, the experts’49 conviction that the technology 
likely will evolve so that at some point electronic agents will “act autonomously, and not just 
automatically.”50 
The new Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)51 as revised in May 
200352 includes provisions regarding contracts for the sale of goods concluded by one or two 
electronic agents. The definition of an electronic agent 53 under the new Article 2 was 
borrowed from the UETA, 54 and the exact language of the UETA was used for the UCC. 
Therefore, whether under the UETA or the UCC, the term “electronic agent” refers to the 
same thing.  
 
ii. The E-SIGN 
E-Sign, or the Electronic Commerce in Global and National Commerce Act,55 was 
signed on June 30, 2000 by President Clinton. Its purpose is to facilitate the use of electronic 
media in transactions and to implement a uniform legal basis regarding electronic 
commerce.56 E-Sign contains only two provisions on electronic agents, 57 including a 
definition of electronic agent. E-Sign was based in part on the UETA, 58 and the definition of 
electronic agent set out in E-Sign59 is similar to UETA’s definition.60 There is, nonetheless, a 
                                              
48 UETA §2 cmt. 5. 
49 See Allen et al., supra note 28; see also Bin,  supra note 1. 
50 UETA, §2 cmt. 5.   
51 UCC §§ 2-101, 2-102 (1968). 
52 UCC §2-204 (Draft of Article 2 Amendments Approved at A.L.I. Annual Meeting May 13, 2003), available at 
http://www.ali.org/ (last visited June 9, 2004). 
53 Id, at. §2-103(1)(g). An electronic agent is defined as “a computer program or an electronic or other automated 
means used independently to initiate an action or respond to electronic records or performances in whole or in 
part, without review or action by an individual.” 
54 UCC §2-204 cmt. 4.  
55 ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN GLOBAL AND NATIONAL COMMERCE ACT (2000).  
56 Jane K. Winn & Robert A. Witte, E-Sign of the Times , 2 No. 9 E-Commerce L. Rep. 2 (2000). 
57 E-SIGN, § 101(a)(2). See also infra Chapter 3 for the recognition of the validity of contracts concluded by 
electronic agents.  
58 Winn et al., supra note 56.  
59 E-SIGN, §106(3). 
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difference important enough to create some confusion. E-Sign states that an electronic agent 
acts “without review or action by an individual at the time of the action or response.”61 By 
adding a specific time where the UETA does not specify anything, the E-Sign leads one to 
wonder if under the UETA, a system that needs human intervention after some stages of the 
process can be characterized as an electronic agent.62 Nevertheless, since the E-Sign provides 
that state enactment of the UETA may supercede E-Sign with respect to state law if the 
UETA is adopted as recommended by NCCUSL, 63 perhaps no issues will arise from these 
differences. 64 
 
b. The UCITA 
 
The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act65 was adopted on July 24, 1999 
by the NCCUSL.66 The Act’s purpose is to regulate e-commerce, and it contains several 
provisions regarding the use of electronic agents.67 When starting to work on this new set of 
rules for e-commerce, the NCCUSL drafters actually intended to revise Article 2 of the 
UCC68 in order to take into account the use of new technologies.69 A Committee70 was 
charged to draft a new Article 2B for the UCC.71 After a certain period, the drafters realized 
that electronic transactions were different from traditional ones and could not be integrated 
                                                                                                                                              
60 UETA §2(6). 
61 E-SIGN, §106(3). 
62 Middlebrook et al., supra note 8, at 351. 
63 E-Sign, §102(a)(1). 
64 Middlebrook et al., supra note8, at 351. 
65 UNIFORM COMPUTER INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS  ACT (1999), available at  
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc.htm (last visited June 9, 2004). 
66 See supra note 45. 
67 UCITA §§ 107, 112, 202, 206 & 214. 
68 UCC art.2 governs the contracts for sale of goods.  
69 Comments of the National Conference of Commissioners on the Uniform State Laws, available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc.htm (last visited June 9, 2004). 
70 The Drafting Committee on Electronic Communications in Contractual Transactions, later renamed the 
Drafting Committee on the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, was created by the NCCUSL in 1996. 
71 See supra note 69. 
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into the articles of the UCC.72 Thus, the project was renamed UCITA. The Act is more 
ambitious than the UETA73 and more controversial.74 In 2002, only Maryland and Virginia 
had adopted the UCITA. 75  
The UCITA addresses electronic agents.76 According to the UCITA drafters, 77 an 
electronic agent is “a computer program or electronic or other automated means used 
independently to initiate an action or respond to electronic messages or performances without 
review or action by an individual at the time of the action, response or performance.”78 This 
definitional language incorporates the notion of autonomy. On the other hand, the Act’s 
comments79 provide that “the automated system must have been selected, programmed or 
otherwise used for that purpose by the person that is bound by its operations.” 80 In a 
subsequent section, this paper will examine more fully the implications of the UCITA’s 
approach for the legal relationship between the electronic agent and its user.81 It is important 
to note here, however, that the UCITA seems to treat the agent as a hybrid creature, with 
elements of a traditional agent and a communication tool.82 
 
2. No Definition under European Statutes 
 
When it comes to the definition of electronic agents, there is no statute available today in 
the European Union that clarifies the issue. Regulatory initiatives in fact are very limited. If 
                                              
72 David D. Wong, The Emerging Law of Electronic Agents: E-Commerce and Beyond…, 33 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 
83, 92 (1999). 
73 See Middlebrook & Muller, supra  note 8, at 352.  
74 Id. 
75 See UCITA in the States, available at http://www.cpsr.org/program/U.C.I.T.A/U.C.I.T.Astates.html (last 
visited June 9,2004). 
76 See infra pp.25 -26. 
77 See supra note 67. 
78 UCITA §102(28). 
79 UCITA §102(28), Reporter’s Note. 
80 Id. 
81 See infra Chapter 2.C.1. 
82 Lerouge, supra note 41, at 421.  
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some European Acts recognize in general the validity of contracts concluded by electronic 
means, there is no direct reference to the possibility of conclusion through or by electronic 
agents.  83  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
83 See infra Chapter 3.B.1. 
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CHAPTER 3 
VALIDITY AND FORMATION OF CONTRACTS CONCLUDED BY ELECTRONIC 
AGENTS 
 
A. Distinguishing Older Forms of Electro nic Contracting (Electronic Data Interchange) 
from the New Electronic Agents 
 
Electronic means actually have been used in business transactions for the past twenty 
years,84 mainly with the use of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI).85 EDI is a method that 
businesses use to exchange information electronically,86 from orders and confirmations 
constituting a contract to inventory management and shipment status.87 EDI was developed in 
the early 1970s.88 A significant characteristic of EDI is that “the information being 
communicated is structured into standard formats, permitting effective, comprehensible data 
exchanges irrespective of the particular hardware or software implemented at either end of the 
transmission by the communicating parties.”89 In the 1990s, some said EDI introduced 
“fundamental changes in the manner in which contracts for the sale of goods are made and 
performed.” 90 In addition, the Electronic Messaging Services Task Force noted that the 
existing rules regarding the formation and the validity of contracts were inappropriate for the 
use of EDI.91 The traditional rules of interpretation were also said inadequate for contracts 
                                              
84 Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Contracting with Electronic Agents, 50 Emory L.J. 1047, 1050 (2001).  
85 The Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, The Commercial Use of Electronic Data Interchange – A 
Report and Model Trading Partner Agreement, 45 Bus. Law. 1645, 1649 (1990). 
86 Bellia, supra note 84, at 1050. 
87 Middlebrook & Muller, supra note 8, at 347. 
88 The Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, supra note 85, at 1650. 
89 Id. 
90 Id., at 1649. 
91 Id., at 1649-1650 
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concluded through EDI.92 Therefore, a model agreement was developed. 93 The parties using 
EDI usually establish a written agreement at the beginning of the relationship regarding the 
kinds of transactions they agree to conduct via this method. 94 Because of the costs EDI 
generates, its users are primarily big corporations.95 In addition, no litigation has arisen from 
the use of EDI96 and, therefore, no body of case law has been developed to create a legal 
framework for resolving EDI disputes.  This lack of litigation makes using EDI as a model for 
setting rules regarding the use of electronic agents difficult.97 Moreover, electronic agents 
differ considerably from EDI in different aspects.98 First, the parties to a contract concluded 
through autonomous agents usually do not know each other. EDI parties do know each 
other.99 Second, EDI parties have signed a trading partner agreement before any 
transaction. 100 Finally, with EDI, the parties are usually corporations that use EDI for repeated 
transactions with the same buyer or seller.  With electronic agents, one or both of the parties 
may be a consumer.101 Thus, electronic agency is a broader concept that has potentially more 
wide reaching impact than EDI has in the past. 
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B. Statutory Recognition 
 
1. The European Union 
 
In 1997, the European Commission promulgated an Initiative on Electronic Commerce 
with the goal to create a coherent framework for electronic commerce and to promote its 
growth in Europe.102 Several Directives resulted from this Initiative. The three most important 
are the Directive on Electronic Commerce, 103 the Directive on Electronic Signatures 104 and 
the Directive on Distance Contracts. 105 The Directive on Electronic Signatures does not 
present particular relevance for the purpose of this analysis. A few words must be said 
regarding the Directive on Distance Contracts. 106  The Act was passed on May 20, 1997 and 
“aims to approximate informational requirements of the Member States’ laws concerning 
distance contracts between consumers and suppliers in order to protect the consumers.” 107 A 
distance contract is defined as 
any contract concerning goods or services concluded between a 
supplier and a consumer under an organized distance sales or 
service-provision scheme run by the supplier, who, for the purpose 
of the contract, makes exclusive use of one or more means of 
distance communication up to and including the moment at which 
the contract is concluded. 108 
  
                                              
102 Eu ropean Initiative on Electronic Commerce: Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
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The Directive therefore applies to contracts concluded on the Internet, implicitly recognizing 
this type of contract.109 Nonetheless, it does not say anything regarding the use of electronic 
means in particular. In addition, it contains a lot of exceptions concerning the types of 
contracts subject to the law. 110  
The newest and most important European regulation regarding electronic contracting 
is the Directive on Electronic Commerce. 111 It was issued on June 8, 2000. Its objective is “to 
create a legal framework to ensure the free movement of information society services between 
Member States….”112 For the Parliament  and Council, the elimination of obstacles in 
cyberspace falls into the same category as the suppression of internal frontiers within the 
Community. 113 Therefore, the Directive on Electronic Commerce requires the European 
States to remove every legal obstacle to the use of electronic contracts.114 Article 9 of the 
Directive regarding the treatment of contract states that 
[m]ember States shall ensure that their legal system allows 
contracts to be concluded by electronic means. Member States 
shall in particular ensure that the legal requirements applicable to 
the contractual process neither create obstacles for the use of 
electronic contracts nor result in such contracts being deprived of 
legal effectiveness and validity on account of their having been 
made by electronic means.115 
 
By this provision, the Act officially recognizes the validity of contracts concluded through 
electronic means and seeks to ensure that these contracts will be enforceable in every 
European country. Although the Directive does not expressly mention electronic agents, and 
there is no definition of what the drafters intended by “electronic means,” it may reasonably 
be inferred that electronic agents are part of “electronic means.” This inference is reinforced 
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by the Executive Summary of the Proposal text of the Directive, 116 which provides that the 
“Member States will … not prevent the use of electronic systems as intelligent electronic 
agents.”117  
Paragraph (2) of Article 9 provides a list of exceptions. 118 The States may decide, for 
instance, that Paragraph (1) will not apply to real estate transactions or to contracts governed 
by family law or by the law of succession. 119 Nonetheless, the Directive makes sure not to 
give the States the opportunity to use this list of special contracts to prevent the  enforceability 
of electronic contracts in an extensive and abusive way. Thus, the States are required to 
submit a list of these contracts and, every five years, a report on the application of the 
exceptions. 120 
It is important to note here that these Directives are not self-executing. 121 They must be 
transposed into the national legal systems of the different States. 122 The States usually have 
two years to adopt new laws or modify their existing regulations to comply with the European 
Directive.123 When a contract is concluded, therefore, it is national law (and not the Directive) 
that governs the transaction,124 but the Directive ensures that national regulations are uniform, 
at least to some extent. Thus, it was decided that the States had to transpose the Directive on 
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Electronic Commerce by January 17, 2002.125 Luxemburg, Austria and Germany were the 
only countries to meet the deadline.126 Today, France still has not transposed the Directive. 127 
France, however, and other States128 have introduced into its legislation a horizontal provision 
stipulating that contracts concluded by electronic means have the same legal validity as 
contracts concluded by more traditional means.129 In addition, the Directive still may be 
applied in the other European States. When the deadline has passed and a Directive is still not 
transported into national law, individuals may invoke the European Act directly before the 
national courts, if its provisions are clear, precise and unconditional.130 
Therefore, the European Community has recognized the va lidity of contracts 
concluded through electronic means, and consequently through autonomous agents, although 
no express provision has been passed on the matter yet. Nevertheless, as will be developed 
later,131 national legislatures still play a central role regulating contracts concluded through 
electronic agents.  
 
2. The UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce 
 
In 1996, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
adopted a Model Law on Electronic Commerce.132 The Model Law aims to remove legal 
obstacles regarding the use of electronic commerce and to set a framework for it.133 The text 
is neither an international convention nor a treaty and therefore it does not have any binding 
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effect. 134 Nevertheless, Illinois in the United States, and Ireland and France in Europe, have 
adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce. 135 Furthermore, both the 
United States, with the UETA, 136 and the European Union, with the Directive on Electronic 
Commerce, 137 used the Model Law on Electronic Commerce in their legislation regarding the 
matter. As stated in Article 5, 138 the main purpose of the UNCITRAL Model Law is to make 
sure that information will “not be denied legal effect, validity or enforceability solely on the 
grounds that it is in the form of a data message.”139  
Although the Model Law does not expressly use the term “electronic agent,” the 
notion is implied in Article 2, 140 which defines the originator of a data message as the 
“person by whom, or on whose behalf, the data message purports to have been sent or 
generated prior to storage, if any, but it does not include a person acting as an intermediary 
with respect to that data message.”141 In addition, in the comments on Article 2,142 the 
drafters explain that the notion of “person” must be understood as referring both to natural 
persons and legal entities. 143 “Data messages that are generated automatically by computers 
without direct human intervention” 144 therefore fall into the scope of Article 2(c). The Model 
Law states, moreover, that a data message is deemed to be that of the originator if it was sent 
“by an information system programmed by, or on behalf of, the originator to operate 
automatically.”145 The drafters of the Model Law decided not to address fully and directly, 
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however, the substantial questions of principal-and-agent law that can arise with the use of 
electronic agents :  
 
 [T]he Model Law should not be misinterpreted as allowing for a 
computer to be made the subject of rights and obligations. Data 
messages that are generated automatically by computers without 
direct human intervention should be regarded as "originating" from 
the legal entity on behalf of which the computer is operated. 
Questions relevant to agency that might arise in that context are to 
be settled under rules outside the Model Law. 146   
 
Thus, if the Model Law implicitly recognizes the validity of contracts concluded through the 
use of electronic agents, it also makes clear that an electronic agent cannot be seen as the 
legal entity behind the offer and acceptance of a contract. Rather, an electronic agent should 
be considered as acting on behalf of a responsible legal entity: An autonomous agent may be 
seen either as a mere communication tool or as the agent of its user.147 
 
3. The United States 
 
 As has been stated earlier,148 there are three main attempts of legislation regarding 
electronic agents available in the United States: UETA149, E-Sign150 and UCITA.151  
 
a. UETA & Article 2 of the UCC 
 
 We have seen earlier 152 that the new Article 2 of the UCC as revised in May 2003 
borrows the definition of electronic agent from the UETA153 On the other hand, the UETA 
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refers to Article 2 and common law principles in order to determine whether there is 
formation of a contract.154 Indeed, the UETA does not aim to provide substantive law 
regarding electronic contracts.155 Nonetheless, both texts recognize the validity of a contract 
formed by electronic agents. Thus, the UETA establishes that a contract may be formed 
either by two electronic agents or by one electronic agent and an individual.156 Section 14157 
provides rules regarding automated transactions and states that:  
(1) A contract may be formed by the interaction of electronic 
agents of the parties, even if no individual was aware of or 
reviewed the electronic agents’ actions or the resulting terms 
and agreements. 
 
(2) A contract may be formed by the interaction of an 
electronic agent and an individual, acting on the individual’s 
own behalf or for another person, including by an interaction in 
which the individual performs actions that the individual is free 
to refuse to perform and which the individual knows or has 
reason to know will cause the electronic agent to complete the 
transaction or performance. 158   
 
In addition, the UETA, unlike Article 2, requires the party’s assent to conduct an electronic 
transaction. 159 Also, the UETA gives the party a non-waivable right to refuse future 
electronic transactions,160 while Article 2 specifically validates any action of the electronic 
agent and attributes it to the parties. 161 On the other hand, the provision of the UETA related 
to the attribution of electronic records does not expressly mention electronic agents. 162 UETA 
provisions seem to rely on Article 2 of the UCC,163 but with the revision of the latter, 
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difficulties may arise. 164 Nevertheless, both the UETA and the new Article 2 envisage use of 
electronic agents in situations where humans program their machines to act according to 
certain parameters. 165 It is also interesting to note that Article 2 opens the door to new 
possibilities (or problems166) since it does not require human intervention or assent before the 
conclusion of the contract. The UETA does not prevent a party from raising the absence of 
assent. 167 However, absence of assent may be no longer available as a defense under the new 
Article 2.  
 
b. E-Sign 
 
 We said earlier in this analysis that E-Sign168 contains only two provisions on 
electronic agents: a definition169 and a principle similar to the UETA that a contract may not 
be denied effect solely because it was formed by electronic agents. 170 The use of electronic 
agents is therefore  authorized by E-Sign. Nonetheless, E-Sign recognizes the validity of 
contracts concluded by autonomous agents only as “long as the action of any such electronic 
agent is legally attributable to the person to be bound.” 171 These last words may encourage 
part ies to avoid responsibility by denying that the actions of the electronic agent are legally 
attributable to them.172 Once again, these issues may never arise since E-Sign contains an 
express savings clause regarding state enactment of the UETA173 
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c. UCITA 
 
 The UCITA, like the other Acts, states the general principle that contracts 
concluded through the use of electronic agents are enforceable, and “even if no individual 
was aware of or reviewed the agent’s operations or the results of the operations.”174 It also 
attributes an electronic agent’s actions to its owner.175 But the UCITA goes further than the 
other texts by trying to set rules as to the manifestation of assent by an electronic agent. 176 
Section 112 177 provides that an “electronic agent manifests assent to a record or term if, after 
having an opportunity to review it, the electronic agent authenticates the record or term; or 
engages in operations that in the circumstances indicate acceptance of the record or term.”178 
The use of circumstances to decide whether there is acceptance may result in defenses that 
will have to be examined by the trier of facts and that will therefore survive a motion for 
summary judgment.179 Nevertheless, the UCITA drafters have tried to foresee the possible 
problems by adding in the Comments180 that assent of an electronic agent must be measured 
by its ability to react and by an assessment of the implications of its actions, since assent 
cannot be based on knowledge or reason to know. 181 Moreover, the conduct or operations 
manifesting assent may be proved in any manner. 182 The UCITA also provides an 
opportunity to review the contract and explains how this opportunity must be understood 
when exercised by an electronic agent.183 Thus, an electronic agent “has an opportunity to 
review a record or a term only if it is made available in a manner that would enable a 
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reasonably configured electronic agent to react to the record or term.”184 The reference to 
“reasonably configured” implies the existence of standards regarding the configuration of 
trading bots and as long as these standards are not created or at least not generally 
recognized, complex litigation may arise. 185    
 If contracts concluded by electronic agents are now widely recognized by 
legislatures, none of the attempt of regulation described abo ve deals expressly with the 
question regarding the status to give electronic agents. Therefore, we must look to general 
principles and see if any is applicable to electronic agents. 
 
C. Doctrinal Problems 
 
1. Capacity of Contracting 
 
 As the preceding discussion suggests, an electronic agent might be seen merely as 
a communication tool, something like a telephone or a fax machine. The emergence of 
autonomous electronic agents, however, invites the application of at least some of legal 
doctrines governing principals and agents. And there is the intriguing notion that autonomous 
electronic agents ought to be treated in some ways as legal “persons.” 
 
a. Legal Personhood 
 
American law and French law take somewhat different approaches to the question of 
who or what should  be treated as a legal “person” with the capacity to contract. The two legal 
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systems therefore might be expected to differ on the question of whether computer programs 
should be treated as legal “persons.” 
 
i. The United States 
 
A person may be defined as “a subject of legal rights and duties.”186 It is well 
recognized that legal persons can be natural or artificial. 187 The range of artificial persons is 
broad, ranging from corporation to ships or even international organizations.188 American 
law does not expressly bar the treatment of computers as legal persons.189 Actually, there is 
no rule to determine whether a certain entity is entitled to legal personhood. 190 Authors 
envision three possible arguments under which legal personality could be conferred to 
computers.191 The first explanation is moral entitlement.192 When a person has rights or 
interests that are specific and individual, the person needs to be given legal personality to 
protect the rights or interests. 193 Thus, for instance, some authors have said that whales 
should be conferred legal personality because they have achieved some level of self-
consciousness and are capable of suffering.194 This argument has been extended to 
imaginable computers.195 For the advocates of this theory, 196 the fact that self-consciousness 
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does not result from biological processes should not matter.197 The key point is self-
consciousness. If a machine possesses self-consciousness, then it can claim a dignity 
analogous to human dignity and ought to have the protection flowing from legal personhood. 
No one has demonstrated, of course, that any existing computer program possesses self-
consciousness.198 And even assuming that self-conscious software will emerge, self-
consciousness may not be an adequate criterion for legal personhood.199 Perhaps most 
importantly here, the focus of this paper is not harm to autonomous electronic agents, but 
protection of those who use these agents to create some rights or duties and the validity of the 
agreements resulting from this use. 200 The protection of the software, which does not have 
any separate interest in the transaction, is not really relevant here.201  
Another possible reason for conferring legal personality on software agents is the 
recognition of social reality. 202 Under this theory, an entity is recognized as a legal person 
because it is already seen as a person by society. 203 Individuals, for example, are the creators 
of organizations, but organizations easily can be described as having their own objectives and 
as acting according to their own policies.204 On the othe r hand, in the legal context, a legal 
person is simply an entity whose acts have legal consequences. 205 Thus, under social reality 
theory, deeming entities legal persons is necessary in order to adapt the law to an existing 
situation. 206 For instance, it would  be very difficult to treat lobbying organizations only as 
groups of individuals. Society recognizes these organizations as distinct from the individuals 
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that create them. Therefore, attributing legal personality to these organizations is the best 
way to adapt law to reality and to ensure that law is applied properly. 207 “The legal system is 
exposed to massive pressure to complete the social personification by legal 
personification.” 208  
Computers are obviously very different from organizations, but the practic al 
arguments for conferring legal personhood on computers are similar. We want to distinguish 
the entity’s actions from the actions of its members. 209 In a similar way, when it comes to 
computers, we might have practical reasons to distinguish between the machine and its 
user.210 Thus, the relevant question is whether those who trade with electronic agents see the 
agent, rather than its owner, as the source of the communication. 211 The question is really one 
of perception. Society is now inclined to accept that computers can manage difficult 
operations by themselves, even play chess.212 Is society ready to say that computers are 
distinct persons because they can conclude contracts? Perhaps not. The reasonable person 
probably would look for hints of characteristically human behavior:213 Does an electronic 
agent, during the process of formation of the contract, act like a human being would? Is there 
some bargaining strategy? Is this strategy one that a natural person would employ? This 
requirement does not seem to be a hindrance. After all, electronic agents are developed to 
negotiate and conclude contracts. The construction of a trading strategy is one of their 
features, or at least will be in the near feature. If so, it is not impossible that society will 
recognize computers as initiating and conducting negotiations independently from their 
human controllers. This would certainly “put pressure on the legal system to describe the 
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computer as a legal person.”214 Some authors215 go further by envisaging a “social hybrid 
person” 216 constituted by the human and the machine. They argue that the concept of 
partnership might be more accepted than the idea of a computer acting on its own.217 And 
this concept still would enable the human to distinguish himself from his electronic agent’s 
actions.218 Nonetheless, if this argument presents incontestable advantages, it is difficult to 
see how a tandem man-machine may be widely accepted and recognized as an entity by 
itself. 
The last reason for deeming computers legal persons is mere convenience. 219 The 
main purpose under this view is to protect the persons who reasonably rely on the actions of 
the machine.220 With this purpose in mind, we then decide which solution is the most 
convenient and least expensive to apply. Ships are an example of legal exp ediency. Society 
does certainly not see ships as persons, nor as having a moral entitlement to legal personality. 
Nonetheless, by treating ships as legal persons, we ensure that the rights of the persons who 
“do business with them” are protected. And this is the reason why electronic agents raise a 
different issue. Giving autonomous agents legal personality would not help to protect people 
who deal with them. If the electronic agent is not a legal person and is seen only as a 
software application,221 the parties to a contract concluded through electronic agents will be 
the human controllers. Therefore, the party who feels his or her rights have been neglected 
will turn to the other party. If the electronic agent is a legal person, then the prospect arises of 
a lawsuit against the agent. But what relief could be made available in such a lawsuit? 
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Obviously, an electronic agent does not have any assets. 222  It is difficult to identify sanctions 
that could be imposed on it.  
To address this accountability problem, it has been proposed that agency software be 
insured to satisfy legal judgments. 223 In this hypothesis, an insurance payment would be 
made by the human controller, and the insurer who would end up paying (in other words 
being responsible) for losses caused by the electronic agent. And the interest in using legal 
personality would be lost.224 In addition, there may be a problem regarding the identification 
of the electronic agent.225 What is the person? The software itself? The hardware? And what 
if the two are in different places? Some have proposed a system of registration, similar to 
what is done for corporations.226 The natural or artificial person who wants to use an 
electronic agent would have to register it first. This way, in the event of litigation, it would be 
possible to know who the person behind the agent is. Here, once again, the advantage of 
deeming electronic agents legal persons seems minimal, since the system of registration 
would have the ultimate purpose of finding another person (the registrant) responsible for the 
electronic agent. It would essentially impose strict liability on the registrant for the wrongful 
(unauthorized) actions of its electronic agent. 
  
ii. France 
 
French law is divided into public and private laws. Both may recognize artificial 
persons, but the requirements for acquiring legal personhood are different. This paper focuses 
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only on the creation of legal personality in private law. 227 Like American law, French law 
recognizes various sorts of artificial persons. Companies, associations and economic 
organizations228 may be deemed legal persons with rights and obligations.229 The creation of 
the artificial person generally 230 must be made by a written contract executed by one or more 
human beings. This contract must be published. Without the formality of publication, legal 
personality will not be extended to the entity.231 It is not impossible to imagine a similar 
system for electronic agents. An agent’s owner would have to register it and publicize the 
registration. The system of publicity has the purpose of protecting other persons who might 
do business with the entity. A system of registration when applied to electronic agents would 
create a safer environment and might persuade individuals to rely on these agents. On the 
other hand, the attribution of legal personality to the electronic agent might shift liability 
away from the agent’s owner, undermining any advantage created by a system of 
registration. In addition, another difficulty appears. In French law, the attributes of physical 
persons are not applicable to artificial entities. 232 Nonetheless, legal personality in both cases 
implies the existence of a patrimony. 233 Patrimony refers to the duties and rights that have an 
economic value. 234 To calculate the patrimony of a person, one must look at the  person’s 
assets and debts.235 Neither electronic agents nor computers in general have a patrimony. 
They are actually part of another person’s patrimony. Without the existence of personal 
assets, French law is likely to refuse the recognition of legal personality to electronic agents. 
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b. Agent 
 
Another possible solution would be to see the robot as an agent of its owner. This 
seems to be the most natural approach, but if we view electronic agents under traditional 
agency principals, we see that the analogy is not perfect.  There are fundamental differences 
between real and electronic agents, and current agency law would have to be modified to 
accommodate those differences. 
 
 
i. The United States 
 
Use of the term “electronic agent” can be misleading to lawyers and judges, because 
it suggests the applicability of the traditional law governing principals and agents.236 This 
section of the paper takes up the question of the suitability of principal-and-agent doctrines in 
the context of electronic agents. The discussion avoids the use of the term “electronic agent” 
and uses instead such terms as software programs. 
According to the Restatement (Second) of Agency, agency refers to the relationship 
between an agent and a principal. An agent is someone who, with the consent of a principal, 
agrees to act on the behalf of the latter and under his control. 237  Under agency law, an agent 
may have the power to contract on behalf of the principal. 238 In order for the principal to be 
bound by the agent’s actions, the latter must have autho rity from the former.239 If a contract 
is concluded by an agent who has no authority to do so, the contract has no effect on the 
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principal.240 Authority is defined as “the power of an agent to bind the principal by acts done 
in accordance with the principal’s manifestations of consent”241 and may be actual or 
apparent. 242  
Actual authority is given through oral or written instructions and usually includes so-
called “implied authority,243 defined as the authority to perform acts that are incidental to the 
main transaction or necessary to carry it. 244 Not every related action falls under implied 
authority, and the standard of reasonableness is used to decide whether the agent has acted 
within his powers.245 Implied authority also may allow the agent to delegate parts of his task 
to sub-agents. 246  
Apparent authority, on the other hand, does not result directly from the principal’s 
instructions, but “is derived from the circumstances of a situation.”247 The focus is on third 
parties’ reasonable perceptions.248 If a third party reasonably believes, based on the 
principal’s behavior in the circumstances, that the agent has authority to act on behalf of the 
principal, the principal will be bound by the agent’s actions.249 The principal may seek relief 
from the agent, but he or she still will be responsible to third parties.250 The purpose is to 
allow an innocent third-party to recover from the principal when he or she is misled, either 
intentionally or negligently. 251 
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At first glance, it seems convenient and somehow logical to apply agency principles 
to the human–software relationship:  
When computers are given the capacity to communicate with each 
other based upon preprogrammed instructions, and when they 
possess the physical capability to execute agreements on shipments 
of goods without any human awareness or input into the 
agreements beyond the original programming of the computer's 
instructions, these computers serve the same function as similarly 
instructed human agents of a party and thus should be treated 
under the law identically to those human agents. 252 
 
The rule seems simple. When a human being uses a software program as a mere tool, the 
software should be treated as a tool, analogous to a fax machine or other communication 
device, 253 but when a human actor uses a software program as he or she would use a human 
agent, the software should be treated as the law treats a human agent.254 Agency doctrines, 
however, cannot be applied in a straightforward way to transactions involving software 
programs. First, as already noted, agency requires the consent of both parties, the principal 
and the agent. 255 While it has been argued that an individual who uses a software to conclude 
contracts gives actual authority to the program to do so, 256 the problem regarding the consent 
of the agent remains.257 The agent must give consent because agency implies rights and 
duties. 258 Hence, most authors259 recognize that “[i]n a principal-computer-agent relationship, 
the concept of the computer consenting is absurd.”260 If software programs can act according 
to their owners’ instructions, it cannot be said that they are under legal obligation to do so or 
that they consent to act according to the human’s wishes.261 Some writers 262 therefore opt for 
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the use of a presumption or a legal fiction of consent,263 at least until it can be said  that 
softwares can give consent. 
In addition, assuming the problem of consent can be solved, the question of the agent’s 
responsibility remains. Under agency law, the principal cannot be held responsible for his 
agent’s actions, if the latter does not act according to the former’s mandate.264 In this case, the 
agent will be liable for his wrongdoing. 265  As has been discussed earlier, 266 robots are not 
capable at law (at least not yet) and therefore, they cannot be held liable for their acts. It is 
easy to see the possible difficulties that might arise from such a concept. For instance, if 
because of a malfunction in the program, the robot enters into a contract for which the human 
trader has not given any instructions, the human actor may claim that his agent did not act 
within his mandate and the other party may be left without any relief. That is why it has been 
argued that “[b]ots may be programmed to do all […] things, but a malfunction is not a breach 
of a legal duty. A principal would be legally responsible for the acts of the electronic agent, 
even those that resulted from program malfunction.” 267 Indeed, the principal’s liability may 
extend to other robots. It has been noted earlier268 that actual authority may include authority 
to perform incidental acts, and  even power to delegate parts of the tasks to sub-agents. 
Technologies are now being developed that enable the collaboration of several robots. 269 
Therefore, the principal could be bound by transactions concluded by other robots. Thus, one 
may wonder about the pertinence of applying agency principles to bot–human actor 
relationships. After all, if the human trader must be responsible for every robot’s act, what is 
the interest in deeming the robot an agent?270 On the other hand, if agency principles are 
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enforceable and the principal may avoid liability for his agent’s actions, what remedy is 
available to the other party? Apparent authority is perhaps the solution.  
When a human actor uses a robot to conduct transactions, he seems to give the clear 
impression to the other party that the robot is his agent.271 In this case, the courts will hold 
him liable even for his agent’s unauthorized acts272 and the innocent third party will be 
protected. However, apparent authority is based on third parties’ perceptions, and as we have 
seen earlier in this analysis, it is possible for a party who enters into a contract with an 
electronic agent simply to believe he or she is conducting a transaction with the human actor-
principal directly. 273 In addition, the owner must do more than use the robot; he must make it 
clear that the computer is his agent.274  
Thus, existing agency principles seem inadequate for the use of robots in contracting. 
Perhaps the solution is the use of the legal fiction that robots are agents as some authors 275 
have suggested. Or maybe robots should be a new kind of agent, with specific rules. 276 In 
deciding whether agency law is an adequate system for the relationship between human trader 
and robot, one should bear in mind the purpose of agency. Agency aims to govern a 
relationship between two individuals, who possess free will and who, therefore, may act on 
their own. Agency has the objective of protecting the agent acting on behalf of his principal, 
while restricting the principal’s responsibility. Finally, agency tries to make sure that the 
innocent third party will be offered an appropriate remedy. The use of robots presents similar 
concerns, minus the protection of the robot itself of course.277 In evaluating the correct set of 
legal rules, one wants to find a just balance between the protection of the third party and the 
limitation of responsibility of the owner. Agency law seems to offer this. Nonetheless, once 
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again, the main issue remains--the robot’s lack of patrimony. In the traditional world, when 
the principal is not held liable, the third-party may still seek relief from the agent. In parallel, 
if the principal is responsible, he may turn to his agent for recovery. In the world of robots, 
such a system cannot work. Indeed, even if the robot is recognized as solely responsible for 
the wrongdoing, there is no remedy for the winning party. We will develop later the possible 
solutions for the human parties in such cases.278 Nonetheless, it must be noted here that if 
agency principles are applied to robots, one of the human parties (the principal or the third 
party or perhaps a party outside the contractual relationship279) will have to bear the risk of 
malfunction by the robot. 
 
ii. France 
 
When studying whether robots can be deemed agents under French law, one must first 
analyze the concept of agency in the Civil Code.280 Title XIII 281 provides the following 
definition of agency: “an act whereby one person gives to another the power to do something 
for the principal in his name.”282 There has been almost no modification of the law of agency 
since 1804. 283 However, the use of agency in the conduct of business has increased 
considerably and individuals now exercise the function of agent as a regular profession. 284 
Several types of agency exist. First, an agent may act in the principal’s name or on behalf of 
the principal while concealing the principal’s identity (mandat représentatif and mandat non 
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représentatif).285 Second and more common, the agent may introduce himself as working for 
the principal, and third parties know that they are conducting business with the principal, 
through the agent.286 In addition, differentiation must be made between salaried and gratuitous 
agencies. 287 Since salaried agency cannot apply to robots (unless the robot is supplied by a 
third party for a fee),288 we will not develop it here289 and will focus our analysis on gratuitous 
agency.  
In order for the principal-agent relationship to exist, the law requires acceptance by the 
agent.290 As in American law, this condition seems to raise a difficulty as to the application of 
agency principles to robots. Article 1985291 states that the “[a]cceptance of an agency may be 
only tacit and result from the execution given to it by the agent.” 292 Does this mean that robots 
are able to give tacit acceptance? After all, when given instructions to negotiate and conclude 
an agreement, they do so and therefore behave as agents according to Article 1985. When the 
drafters of the Civil Code envisioned agency law, it is clear that they did not have in mind the 
role that robots would play someday. Legislatures, courts and legal experts293 have not spoken 
on the topic yet. Therefore, the question is whether a robot is capable of contracting since by 
its acceptance a contract of agency would be formed between the human actor and the robot. 
Article 1123294 states that “[a]ny person may contract, if he has not been declared incapable 
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thereof by law.” 295 Thus, it must be decided whether a robot is a person by law and as we 
have developed earlier,296 French law may not be ready to recognize such an idea. However, 
the Code allows the principal to give power to a non-emancipated minor,297 who is usually not 
considered a legal person under the law.298 Nonetheless, according to the authors, 299 agency 
requires legal capacity. Minors, as well as married women before 1965, 300 can be chosen as 
agents because they are supposedly not bound by their own acts. 301 The principal has to 
answer for the agent’s actions.302 Moreover, the minor agent is not responsible for his 
mistakes as a capable agent would be. The principal is usually not able to seek relief from the 
minor agent.303  
One may argue that robots are like minors. They are not legal entities but they can still 
engage the principal in legal transactions. Even assuming the law may someday accept this 
theory, the question whether agency is the appropriate framework for analyzing the legal 
status of robots remains. As in American law, there is an issue concerning the responsibility 
of the agent. The agent may have power to conclude a specific agreement or a series of 
contracts.304 If the agent acts within his authority, the principal will be responsible for the 
agent.305 On the other hand, “[h]e is not held to what could have been done further except as 
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he so ratified expressly or impliedly.”306 If the agent exceeds his authority, then he may be 
responsible for his own actions to the third party.307 It will depend on the knowledge of the 
third party. If she or he knew the agent’s limitations of authority, the third party cannot seek 
relief from the agent on this ground. 308 However, if she or he did not know, the agent will be 
responsible for the damages caused to this innocent third party309 and the contract will not be 
enforceable.310 In addition, the capable agent is also responsible for the damages caused to his 
principal when he exceeds his power or makes a mistake.311 Should a robot’s malfunction be 
considered a mistake? If because of a virus the computer concludes the wrong contract, can 
the principal avoid the payment of damages to the innocent third party claiming relief based 
on the agent’s mistake? In the real world, the system works because the party may still seek 
relief from the wrongdoer. In cyberspace, the computer may neither assume responsibility for 
its own mistakes nor provide just relief to its victims. Nonetheless, the system applied to  
minor agents seems to raise the same kind of issues so we could analogize robots to minor 
agents. The drafters and courts in general have simply decided to extend the responsibility of 
the principal to cover all the acts of a minor agent. After all, if the principal chooses an 
incapable as agent, he should be the one bearing the risk and not the innocent third party. It is 
interesting to note that relief is available for the principal when this third party is not innocent 
and knows the agent does not have authority to act on behalf of the principal. The same rules 
could apply to robot agents. 
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c. Communication Tool 
 
The last possible solution regarding electronic agents would be to consider them as 
mere communication tools. In this model, the role played by the robot would be simply 
ignored and every contract concluded by an electronic agent would be attributable to his 
owner. 312 The robot would be treated as a fax machine or a telephone,313 the medium by 
which the contract is concluded. As a result, we would have to disregard the importance of the 
electronic agent in the conclusion of the transaction and ignore its autonomy. “We would 
adopt the legal fiction that anything issuing from the computer really issues directly from its 
human controller.”314  
This approach has the advantage of solving several difficulties. First, there is no need 
to change the existing rules of contracting, 315 since the contract would still be formed between 
two recognized legal persons. In addition, this solution would place the burden upon the user 
of the electronic agent, which according to some authors,316 is a fair allocation of 
responsibility. The user made the choice to delegate his power to a robot. Therefore, if the 
other party does not even know that he or she contracts with an agent, making the user liable 
for his agent’s actions appears to be fair and just.317 Moreover, this view seems to be shared 
by some courts. In 1972, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit318 held an insurance 
company liable for a mistake, which was claimed to ha ve been made by the company’s 
computer system.319 In this case, 320 an individual (Bockhorst ) failed to pay his insurance 
policy. When he had an accident one morning and killed a pedestrian, he sent a check for the 
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amount of the late payments. A controversy over insurance coverage arose. Meanwhile, the 
check was received at the financial branch and entered into the computer. The computer, 
which had received no notification of the accident, reinstated the insurance.321 Bockhorst 
claimed he was covered, while the insurance company later argued it was only a computer 
mistake.322 Deciding in favor of Bockhorst, the court stated:323 
Holding a company responsible for the actions of its computer does 
not exhibit a distaste for modern business practices as [the 
insurance company] asserts. A computer operates only in 
accordance with the information and directions supplied by its 
human programmers. If the computer does not think like a man, it 
is man's fault. The reinstatement of Bockhorst's policy was the 
direct result of the er rors and oversights of [the insurance 
company]'s human agents and employees. The fact that the actual 
processing of the policy was carried out by an unimaginative 
mechanical device can have no effect on the company's 
responsibilities for those errors and oversights. [The insurance 
company]'s reinstatement of Bockhorst's policy while in full 
possession of information establishing its right to refuse 
reinstatement constituted a binding waiver, and the reinstated 
policy effectively extended coverage for the pe riod during which 
Bockhorst's accident occurred. 324 
 
 Thus, according to this approach, the user of the computer has an interest in making 
sure that his or her computer is properly programmed and policed.325 Nonetheless, it cannot 
be denied that computers are able now to be autonomous and that their degree of autonomy 
could increase in the near future. Accordingly, this approach seems to put on the user a heavy 
burden. For instance, what if the other party knew or had reason to know about the 
unexpected communication? Should this party not be held liable for entering into such an 
agreement? Is it fair to hold responsible the user in case of a malfunction due to a virus or a 
negligent third party? The “strict liability” approach of the Tenth Circuit seems to provide no 
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adequate remedy in such cases. 326 Electronic agents are used because they are convenient and 
efficient. They allow their users to save time and money. Developing an absolute liability 
scheme and unnecessary duties may prevent traders from using these new tools.   
 
2. Manifestation of Assent 
 
In addition to the legal capacity issues discussed above, a main concern regarding the 
use of electronic agents is whether they can manifest the assent necessary for the formation of 
a contract. Laws in the United States and France provide different approaches to the 
manifestation of assent. Thus, they will be studied separately.  
 
a. The U.S. Approach or Objective Theory 
 
According to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 327 a contract is “a promise or a 
set of promises.” 328 This promise is expressed by a party, usually through words, although it 
may be also inferred from his conduct. 329 A party’s subjective assent is not necessary to make 
a contract.330 The manifestation of intention only matters.331 Thus, the inquiry will not foc us 
on whether the minds of the parties have met, but rather whether the manifestation of assent is 
sufficient to form the contract.332 Two conditions are required in order for an obligation to be 
created. First, there must be a promise, that is, a “manifesta tion of intent that justifies a 
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promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made.”333 Second, each party’s 
manifestation of assent must be made with reference to the manifestation of the other.334  
The use of electronic agents could be seen as an act of conduct.335 A traditional 
example of an act of conduct would be the case in which a customer has an account with a 
shop or store. If he takes a fruit and shows it to the clerk, his conduct is characterized as an 
offer.336 Subsequently, if the clerk nods, there is acceptance and a contract is formed. 337 
However, using an electronic agent is quite different from this example. When using an 
electronic agent to conduct a transaction, the user is not aware of the agreement until his agent 
concludes the transaction. 338 Yet, the Restatement states that “[t]he conduct of a party is not 
effective as a manifestation of his assent unless he intends to engage in the conduct and 
knows or has reason to know that the other party may infer from his conduct that he 
assents.”339 Therefore, with respect to electronic agents, the question comes down to whether 
a reasonable person would believe that assent has been manifested by the other party, the 
party who chose to use the robot. We might conclude that since the user chooses to send his 
agent into cyberspace with instructions to conclude a certain type of transaction, he has 
manifested assent to be bound by his agent’s actions. Once again, this view seems to be harsh 
on the user. Adopting such a theory would bind the user for every co ntract entered into by his 
electronic agent. 
In addition, some 340 think that this problem must be seen in a different way and that 
the inquiry should focus on the electronic agent’s manifestation of assent rather than the 
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user’s assent through his electronic agent.341 Therefore, the reasonable person standard 
regarding the other party’s intention becomes relevant:342 
[T]his might be correct in so far as the transaction is understood as 
an agreement that is merely mediated by one or more electronic 
devices. In such case, whatever his real intention may be, the party 
employing the electronic device would be conducting himself in 
such a way that a reasonable man would believe that he was 
assenting to the terms proposed by the other party. But the above 
analysis is incorrect in circumstances where an offer can be said to 
be initiated by the electronic device autonomously, i.e. in a manner 
unknown or unpredicted by the party employing the electronic 
device. Here it cannot be said that the party employing the 
electronic device has conducted himself such that a reasonable 
person would believe that he was assenting to the terms proposed 
by the other party. As odd as it may seem to us –  given our 
primitive state of agent technology – there will come a time when a 
electronic device will appear to conduct itself such that a 
reasonable person would believe that the device was assenting to 
the terms proposed by the other party. 343 
 
 In dealing with the issue, the drafters of the UCITA344 officially recognize the ability 
of electronic agents to manifest assent.345 Accordingly, an “electronic agent manifests assent 
to a record or term if, after having an opportunity to review it, the electronic agent 
authenticates the record or term; or engages in operations that in circumstances indicate  
acceptance of the record or term.”346 In addition, a party may prove that an electronic agent 
manifested assent in any manner.347 Notably, a party may show that a processing procedure 
existed which the electronic agent must have executed in order for processing to be 
                                              
341 Id., at 23. 
342 Id . 
343 Id . 
344 See UCITA, supra note 65. 
345 UCITA, supra note 65, at §112.  
346 Id., at §112(b). 
347 Id., at §112(d) :  “Conduct or operations manifesting assent may be shown in any manner, including a 
showing that a person or an electronic agent obtained or used the information or informational rights and that a 
procedure existed by which a person or an electronic agent must have engaged in the conduct or operations in 
order to do so.” 
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complete.348 Thus, the application of the UCITA nationwide could solve any controversy that 
might arise from traditional contract principles regarding assent.  
 
b. The French Approach or Subjective Theory 
 
 The law of contracts in France has been built on the freedom of the individual. 349 The 
theory of the autonomy of the will was taken as the foundation of contractual doctrine in the 
nineteenth century. 350 Accordingly, a contractual obligation can exist only if the other party 
has willed it.351 On the other hand, because the parties are supposed to enter freely into a 
contract, “[a]greements legally made take the place of law for those who make them.” 352 This 
approach led to the development of the supremacy of the inner will.353 When deciding 
whether a party intended to bind himself, the courts have to look at his inner will and not only 
at his declared will.354 However, this theory has been vigorously cr iticized by the French legal 
scholars over the past decades. 355 Today, the application of the autonomy of will has 
numerous exceptions, often to protect the weaker party in the transaction.356  
 With respect to electronic agents, when the traditional doctrine applies (i.e., when 
analysis of the inner will of the party is the correct inquiry to determine whether a contract 
was formed), difficulties arise. The will must be formed prior to or simultaneous with the 
negotiations. If one uses an electronic agent, when can we look at his inner state of mind? The 
                                              
348 Id. 
349 See BARRY NICHOLAS, FRENCH LAW OF CONTRACT 31 (Butterworths, 1982).  
350 Id . 
351 C. CIV., art. 1108:  “Four conditions are essential for the validity of an agreement: The consent of the party 
who obligates himself; His capacity to contract; An object certain which forms the subject matter of the 
engagement; A licit causa in the obligation” ; see also CRABB,  supra  note 282, at 218. 
352 C. CIV, art. 1134; see also CRABB, supra note 282, at 221. 
353 Volonté interne or volonté réelle. 
354 MARTY ET RAYNAUD, DROIT CIVIL – TOME II –  1ER  VOL. –  LES OBLIGATIONS 79 (Sirey : Paris 1962). 
355 See M AZEAUD, MAZEAUD & CHABAS, LEÇONS DE DROIT CIVIL – TOME II -1ER  VOL. OBLIGATIONS : THÉORIE 
GÉNÉRALE  105 (7th ed., Ed. Montchrestien, Paris 1985); see also  ROLAND & BOYER, OBLIGATIONS, TOME II, 
CONTRAT (Litec, 5th ed.,1995). 
356 TOULET , DROIT CIVIL, OBLIGATIONS, RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE 37 (Centre de Publications Universitaires, 
1998) (talking about the protection of consumers or persons in debts). 
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user of an electronic agent will not know the agent negotiated a contract before the robot 
completed its task. Therefore, even though the human controller may give his assent, this will 
not happen prior to or simultaneously with the negotiations. In addition, should we look at the 
inner will of the electronic agent itself as has been suggested earlier in this analysis regarding 
the objective approach?357 Free will may hardly be attributed to a robot. 358  
 On the other hand, if the critics of the autonomy of will prevail and a more objective 
approach is adopted, then the discussion regarding the possible validity of contracts concluded 
by electronic agents under French law would be the same as under U.S. law.  
Although the European Directive on Electronic Commerce 359 requires every European 
State to validate contracts concluded through electronic agents, the French legislature has not 
adopted any positive regulation regarding the use of electronic agents, unlike the United 
States. 360 Therefore, the situation is one of transition where such contracts are declared valid 
but where in the absence of specific rules traditional contract principles must regulate these 
agreements. This may not be the best solution. In the last part of this analysis, some of the 
possible issues arising from the use of electronic agents will be developed and studied under 
existing laws. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
357 See Kerr, supra note 34. 
358 See  supra Chapter 3.C.1.  
359 Directive on Electronic Commerce, supra note 103. 
360 UCITA, supra note 65. 
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CHAPTER 4 
LEGAL CONSEQUENCES 
 
As has been stated earlier in this analysis, the recently adopted provisions, whether 
European or American, do not always provide answers regarding the legal effects that flow 
from the formation of contracts concluded by electronic agents. The following shows several 
issues that may arise and the possible remedies.  
 
A. The Terms of the Contract 
 
1. Parol Evidence Rule 
 
Section 2-202 of the UCC361 states the parol evidence rule  in contracts for the sa le of 
goods. This section was modified with the proposed revisions of May 2003,362 but the 
substance of the article remains the same. According to the parol evidence rule, 
[w]hen two parties have made a contract and have expressed it in a 
writing to which they have both assented as to the complete and 
accurate integration of that contract, evidence, whether parol or 
otherwise, of antecedent understandings and negotiations will not 
be admitted for the purpose of varying or contradicting the 
writing. 363 
 
Thus, if the agreement was integrated, extrinsic evidence cannot be received. An agreement 
is integrated when it represents the final expression of the parties’ agreement regarding the 
terms in such record.364 Therefore, to determine whether there was integration, the courts will 
                                              
361 UCC, §2-202. 
362 See UCC §2-202 (Draft of Article 2 Amendments Approved at ALI meeting on May 13, 2003), available at  
http://www.ali.org  (last visited June 5th, 2004).  
363 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §573 at 357 (1960). 
364 Id.; see also Daniel, supra note 155, at 331. 
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look at the intention of the parties.365 In addition, the integration may be complete or partial. 
Extrinsic evidence may not be used to add to or modify the terms of an agreement (full 
integration), or parol evidence may be received to prove certain elements of the contract only 
(partial integration) .366 It must be noted also that while an integration or merger clause is 
some evidence of integration, it is not conclusive. 367 In addition, the absence of a merger 
clause in a writing does not necessarily permit the use of extrinsic evidence.368 Thus, the 
question of whether the parol evidence rule should apply is really one of circumstances, and 
the courts will look at different factors, such as the existence of a merger clause and the 
sophistication of the parties.369 
  With respect to the use of electronic agents, the parol evidence rule seems difficult to 
apply. 370 In the traditional world, courts already proceed with caution as to the application of 
the rule.371 In the case of a contract concluded through electronic agents, parties do not have 
the opportunity to review the terms prior to the formation of the agreement and a court is 
unlikely to decide a party intended to be bound by the terms of an agreement he or she did 
not have the chance to review or app rove.372 Indeed, it is particularly true when such a 
conclusion would prevent the party from introducing extrinsic evidence regarding the making 
of the agreement.373 Therefore, courts may “be compelled to conclude that agreements made 
by electronic agents without review or approval by individuals can never demonstrate an 
intent that such agreement be a final expression of the terms of the agreement.” 374  
                                              
365 WILLISTON & JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, §633 at 1014-16 (3d ed. 1957). 
366 Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561, 563 (Cal. 1968): “When the parties to a written contract have agreed to it as 
an “integration” – a complete and final embodiment of the terms of an agreement – parol evidence cannot be 
used to add to or vary its terms. When only part of the agreement is integrated, the same rule applies to that part, 
but parol evidence may be used to prove elements of the agreement not reduced to writing.”  
367 Sierra Diesel Injection Service, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 656 F Supp 426 (9th Cir. 1987); for an opposite 
ruling see Luther Williams, Jr., Inc. v. Johnson, 229 A2d 163 (DC 1967).   
368 Bank Leumi Trust Co. v. Wulkan, 735 F Supp 72 (NY 1990). 
369 See Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561, 563 (Cal. 1968); see also CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, §578, at 411 (1960). 
370 See Daniel, supra note 155, at 332. 
371 See Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d, at 563. 
372 Daniel, supra note 155, at 333. 
373 Id. 
374 Id . 
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A related issue concerns the so-called “battle of the forms” that occurs when parties 
exchange standard contract forms but neither party expressly agrees to the other’s form.  
Prior to the May 2003 revisions,375 a party could limit acceptance of his offer only to terms 
contained in his proposed form.376 The other party could make his acceptance conditional to 
the offeror’s acceptance of new terms in his own form.377 It is not clear how electronic agents 
could object to non-matching terms, and what the legal effect of such an objection would be.  
Under the new §2-207, the issue is simplified. One party’s terms do not become part of the 
contract, if the other party’s form does not contain the same terms.378 Thus, electronic agents 
would not have to object to non-matching terms in order to keep them out of the 
agreement.379 
 
2. French Solution  
 
As has been seen earlier,380 in French law, contracts are considered the “law for those 
who make them,”381 and the intention of the parties is the foundation of the principles 
governing contracts. Thus, not surprisingly, the Civil Code provides that “[t]he common 
intention of the contracting parties must be sought in agreements rather than merely the literal 
meaning of terms.”382 And when the contract is clear and unambiguous, the judge must 
respect the agreement as to the result of the parties’ intentions.383 On the other hand, if the 
contract is ambiguous or if a difficulty arises from its terms, the court will interpret the 
agreement according to the parties’ intentions as they were on the day of the conclusion of the 
                                              
375 See supra note 363, The ALI Annual Meeting on May 13, 2003 and the revisions of Article 2 UCC 
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agreement.384 In order to determine the common intention of the parties, the judge will take 
into account various factors, such as the negotiations, and the parties’ behavior prior to or 
after the conclusion of the contract. 385 Thus, regarding the contracts concluded by electronic 
agents, the French courts may struggle like American courts to find the common intention of 
the parties. 
In addition, according to the French law of contracts, a party is bound by the terms of 
an agreement, if he has had the opportunity to review these terms. 386 If a party has had the 
opportunity to review the agreement, he cannot claim he actually did not read it in order to 
avoid its application.387 When one or two electronic agents have concluded a contract, there is 
no opportunity to review the terms. Hence, according to traditional contract principles, the 
party using an electronic agent will not be legally bound by the terms of the agreement until 
he has had an opportunity to see it. However, with the new European Directive on Electronic 
Commerce, 388 Member States must “ensure that the legal requirements applicable to the 
contractual process neither create obstacles for the use of electronic contracts nor result in 
such contracts being deprived of legal effectiveness and validity on account of their having 
been made by electronic means.”389 Existing French law obviously deprives of effectiveness 
contracts concluded through electronic agents if it allows the party–user to claim he has not 
had the opportunity to review the terms of the agreement. The European Directive preempts 
differing French laws so even though the Directive has not been transposed yet in France, 390 
                                              
384 TOULET , supra note 356, at 132. 
385 Civ. 3e, 5.2.1971, Bull. Civ. III, n° 89. 
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individuals may still invoke it before national courts.391 France is still working on the 
transposition392 and this issue could be soon resolved. 
  
B. The Avoidance Doctrines 
 
The use of electronic agents may result in unintentional contractual relationships. 
Since contracting by electronic agents effectively dispenses with the bargaining process, 
undue influence and duress will probably not be invoked to get out of a contract concluded by 
bots. Nevertheless, a claim for mistake or fraud could be asserted. The question is whether the 
traditional views regarding those defenses could be applied to electronic agents. 
 
1. Mistake 
 
a. In the United States 
 
A mistake may be defined as “a belief that is not in accord with the facts.”393 As the 
courts have stated, “a mistake is an unintentional act or omission arising from ignorance, 
surprise, or misplaced confidence. The mistake must be material, that is, so substantial and 
fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties.”394 It is usually used as a defense to avoid 
an otherwise enforceable contract.395 To be ground for cessation, the mistake must have 
                                              
391 France, Netherlands & Portugal have still not transposed the Directive on Electronic Commerce, see 
European Union Preparatory Acts, supra  note 127. 
392 As June 4, 2004, work on the transposition was well advanced, see European Union Preparatory Acts, supra  
note 127. 
393 RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF CONTRACTS §151. 
394 Leydet v. City of Mountain Home, 119 Idaho 1041, 1044 (Ct.App 1991). 
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occurred at the time the contract was made. 396 There are two types of mistake: mutual or 
unilateral. 
Mutual mistake results when both part ies to a contract share a basic assumption 
regarding an important element of the alleged contract and that assumption happens to be 
false.397 As developed by the courts,398 mutual mistake requires four elements. First, “the 
parties to a contract were mistaken in their belief regarding a fact.”399 The fact must exist at 
the time the contract is made. Future events may be used to avoid the contract under other 
theories such as impossibility, 400 impracticability401 or frustration of purpose,402 but the 
doctrine of mistake does not provide any relief for events that occur later. Second, “the 
mistake constitutes a basic assumption underlying the contract.”403 Third, “the mistake had a 
material effect on the bargain.”404 This requirement means that mistakes that have a minor 
effect on the transaction cannot be used to avoid the contract. Finally, “the contract did not 
put the risk of the mistake on the party alleging mistake.”405 Generally speaking, if mutual 
mistake results in “a quite different exchange of values”406 than what the parties thought at the 
time the agreement was made,407 then the contract is voidable (cancelled) or reformable 
(modified).408  
There is unilateral mistake when only one party was mistaken at the time the contract 
was made.409 In order to prove unilateral mistake, the party who has been allegedly mistaken 
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must prove the four elements required for mutual mistake. 410 In addition, the party must also 
prove either that the effect of the mistake causes the contract to be unconscionable or that the 
other party knew or had reason to know about the mistake. 411 It must be noted that a unilateral 
mistake will usually not enable a party to avoid the contract. 412 Nonetheless, there may be 
rescission or modification for unilateral mistake, if there has been “fraud, misrepresentation, 
or other misconduct.” 413  
A party may obtain relief under unilateral mistake if this party can show that the other 
knew or had reason to know about the mistake at the time the contract was made.414 Whether 
the other party knew or had reason to know is a case-by-case question. 415  If it cannot be 
proved that the other party knew or had reason to know of the mistake, the mistaken party still 
has the possibility of obtaining relief by proving that enforcement of the contract would be 
unconscionable. 416 Unconscionability may be a defense by itself.417 Nonetheless, the level 
necessary in order to obtain relief for unilateral mistake seems less burdensome.418 The courts 
will look at the result of performance. For instance, they will inquire whether performance 
would cause a loss for the mistaken party and if so, how important the loss would be. 
With respect to electronic agents, the first concern is the fact that the mistake (mutual 
or unilateral) must have occurred at the time the agreement was made. According to the new 
provisions of the UCC,419 the time of contracting corresponds to the time when the accepting 
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electronic transmission is sent.420 In addition, section 2-204 allows the formation of contracts 
concluded by electronic agents, even if no individual was aware of the age nt’s actions. 421 
Thus, the courts will have to decide whether parties had any mistaken beliefs about the 
agreement or its terms at a point in time when they may not even have known that a contract 
had been formed.422  
In addition, it has been stated that a party may not seek relief for mistake if he bears 
the risk of mistake.423 A party bears the risk of mistake when the risk is allocated to him or 
her by agreement of the parties. 424 Furthermore, a party bears the risk of mistake if the party is 
aware, at the time the contract is made, that he or she has only limited knowledge with respect 
to the facts to which the mistake relates but treats this limited knowledge as sufficient. 425 
Finally, a party bears the risk of mistake if the court allocates it to him or her on the ground 
that it is reasonable in the circumstances to do so.426 For some,427 the fact that a person chose 
to contract through electronic agents means that the party proceeds “with knowledge that in 
all likelihood he will not know that a contract is being formed, not to mention the actual terms 
of the contract.”428 This could be characterized as conscious ignorance and therefore 
acceptance of any mistakes that follow. In addition, the UETA429 tries to set rules regarding 
errors. 430 However, the Act only deals with human errors in automated transactions and it 
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does not refer to errors by electronic agents, such as a malfunction. According to the UETA, 
in cases not described by the Act, the common law of mistake must be applied. 431  
Thus, courts may be willing to decide it is reasonable to allocate the risk of mistake to 
the party–user of the electronic agent. Such a position would be consistent with the courts’ 
decisions regarding transmission errors.432 In Ayer v. Western Union Tel. Co.,433 a mistake 
occurred in a telegram and the offeree accepted for a price far below the one intended by the 
offeror. The court decided that the telegraph company made the mistake but that the party 
choosing the telegraph to communicate should bear the risk. The court held that: 
the safer and more equitable rule, and the rule the public can most 
easily adapt itself to, is that, as between sender and receiver, the 
party who selects the telegraph as the means of communication 
shall bear the loss caused by the errors of the telegraph. The first 
proposer can select one of many modes of communication, both 
for the proposal and the answer. The receiver has no such choice, 
except as to his answer. If he cannot safely act upon the message 
he receives through the agency selected by the proposer, business 
must be seriously hampered and delayed. The use of the telegraph 
has become so general, and so many transactions are based on the 
words of the telegram received, that any other rule would now be 
impracticable . 
 
Accordingly, a similar approach could be taken for the use of electronic agents. The party 
using an electronic agent would be deemed to bear the risk of mistake and would not be able 
to obtain relief under the doctrine of mistake. This reasoning may seem appropriate in the 
                                                                                                                                              
(2) In an automated transaction involving an individual, the individual may avoid the effect of an electronic 
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transactions conducted between professionals but it seems harsh for a consumer who may not 
have a very good understanding of electronic agents’ technology. 434 If this risk allocation is 
accepted, the only possible application of the mistake doctrine would be when both parties 
are using electronic agents.  If both agents were operating under mistaken assumptions, then 
the contract might be voided because of mutual mistake.  Similarly, if the agreement resulted 
in an unconscionable bargain, the doctrine of unilateral mistake might provide relief. 
 
b. In France 
 
Article 1108 of the Civil Code states that a contract is validly formed only if four 
conditions are met: the subject matter of the contract must be certain, the “cause” of the duty 
must be legal, the parties must be capable of contracting, and there must be valid consent. 435 
According to the doctrine of the autonomy of the will, 436 consent is the key element in the 
formation of contracts437 and, to be binding, an agreement must have been freely made. 438 In 
order for the contract to be enforceable, consent needs not only to exist but also to be without 
defect. 439 Mistake or erreur is one of the three defects that may void consent.440 Article 1109 
of the Civil Code provides that there is no valid consent if consent has been given only by 
mistake or if it has been extorted by violence or obtained by deceit.441 Therefore, if there is no 
valid consent, there is no valid agreement and the contract will be held void.  
Mistake may be defined as a false assumption of facts.442 Beyond that basic definition, 
there are several types of mistakes. Some are mentioned by the Civil Code,443 while others 
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have been developed by the legal scholars in secondary sources.444 The Code445 envisions 
only two kinds of mistake (erreur sur la substance and erreur sur la personne) under the 
general category of erreur-nullité , that is, a mistake that raises the nullity of the agreement. 
The first category is erreur sur la substance. The language of the Article 1110446 is very 
vague. 447 It states that the mistake must relate to the “very substance of the thing which is the 
object of the agreement.” 448 The word “substance” has been subject to various 
interpretations.449 The courts have talked about “determining consideration”450 or “the quality 
without which the buyer would not have bought.”451 Once agree ing upon the definition, 
authors still diverge on whether the “substantial quality” should be seen in abstracto or in 
concreto.452 In abstracto  means the quality is substantial if it is the quality expected in general 
for this particular kind of thing. For instance, when a car is bought, the tires are expected to be 
reliable. On the other hand, if the quality is viewed in concreto , one must look for the exact 
quality the party intended to receive. Therefore, the party alleging mistake bears the burden of 
proving that the absent quality was envisioned by the parties at the time the contract was 
made.453 In the event the seller did not know the specific quality expected by the buyer at the 
time of contracting, nullity of the contract cannot be claimed.454 Once again, while applying 
the theory to electronic agents, one would meet difficulties. In the world of electronic agents, 
buyer and seller do not know each other. Therefore, the party alleging the mistake will hardly 
be able to prove the other party knew what his expectations were at the time of contracting.  
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 The second category of erreur-nullité is the mistake as to the person (erreur sur la 
personne). The Civil Code 455 states that a mistake as to the person with whom one intends to 
contract is not a cause of nullity “unless the consideration of this person is the principal cause 
of the agreement.” 456 This type of contract is called intuitu personae.457 Intuitu personae  
contracts are rare when it comes to contracts for sale because one is usually willing to contract 
with anyone as long as the object and conditions are the same. This category does not offer 
any particular relevance for electronic agents, besides the fact that an individual may not be 
able to claim there is no contract because he did not know he was contracting with an 
electronic agent. 
The concept of erreur-obstacle is doctrinal. 458 There is no express mention of it in the 
Civil Code. Because of the mistake, the wills of the parties never met and therefore no 
contract has been formed. 459 Writers 460 have distinguished three cases in which mistake bars 
the formation of a contract: mistake as to the nature of the contract, mistake as to the identity 
of the thing object of the contract, and mistake as to the existence of the contract itself. 461 
First, mistake may be made when parties do not think they enter into the same nature of 
transaction. For instance, one party may think the contract is one of sale when it is actually a 
mere exchange  or lease.462 Then, there may be mistake as to the nature of the thing which is 
the object of the contract. Both parties have a different view of the thing. For example, in 
some older cases, the contract may have asked for payment of 1,000 francs. One party thought 
the contract referred to new francs and the other to old francs.463 Finally, there may be erreur-
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obstacle as to the existence of the contract. The famous illustration is the case464 in which a 
man commited to pay child support for a child he thought was his son. The child was actually 
not his. The court held that the man did not have any obligation and entered into the contract 
for a false reason. 465  
The question of mistake is really one of circumstances. Thus, the courts will have 
power to decide whether a mistake occurred and if so, under which category it falls. This is 
particularly relevant because of the remedy available according to the nature of the mistake. 
French law distinguishes between two kinds of nullity: “absolute nullity” and “relative 
nullity.”466 The main difference concerns the category of people the legislature tries to 
protect.467 In the first case, the general interest is involved. The irregularity of the contract is 
so important that people in general must be protected and prevented from relying on such an 
agreement. In a case of relative nullity, protection of one of the parties is sought. The doctrine 
protects a particular interest. In any event, the nullity must be recognized and declared by a 
judge. 468 Thus, as long as the judge has not pronounced the nullity, the contract has the 
appearance of a valid agreement.469 In addition, the persons able to raise the nullity are 
different in the case of relative nullity. If the nullity is absolute, anybody who has an interest 
in doing so can go before the court. In the event the nullity is relative, only the party who is 
the victim of the mistake can ask the judge to pronounce the nullity of the contract. 470 In 
addition, the period of limitation is not the same. The limitation is five years for relative 
nullity and thirty years in a case of absolute nullity. 471 Furthermore, it must be noted that if the 
nullity is only relative, the victim of the mistake can waive his right for nullity. This action, 
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called “confirmation,” makes the contract valid retroactively. 472 Confirmation may be express 
or tacit,473 but the intent of the party must be real and certain. 474 Confirmation is not possible 
in the event of absolute nullity.475 
Another distinction between erreur-nullité and erreur-obstacle must be made here. 
When erreur-nullité is made, the nullity is relative to the consequences we have seen 
above.476 On the other hand, where there is “erreur -obstacle,” the nullity is absolute and 
therefore the contract cannot be made valid. 477 In addition, as has been developed earlier, 478 
mistake as to the person is usually not relevant. In such a case, the contract remains valid and 
nullity cannot be raised by anybody. 479  
Thus, the user of an electronic agent may stand better chances under French law since 
there is no similar mechanism regarding the allocation of the risk of mistake. The only 
requirement is that the mistake must be excusable. For instance, if it was easy for the 
mistaken party to find out the truth, mistake is inexcusable and no relief will be granted. 480 
Nonetheless, as long as the mistake must have occurred at the time of contracting, the same 
kind of problems arise under French and American laws. When the contract is formed by 
electronic agents, discovering the assumptions of the parties at that time may be problematic. 
 
2. Fraud  
 
With respect to the use of electronic agents, fraud seems a less possible scenario than 
mistake, mainly because of the required intent to deceive. Nonetheless, some issues arise. 
                                              
472 C. CIV., art. 1338, 1339 & 1340. 
473 C. CIV., art. 1338. 
474 TOULET , supra note 356, at 113. 
475 Cass 3e civ., 7.7.1982, Bull. Civ. III, n°176. 
476 TOULET , supra note 356, at 63. 
477 Id. 
478 See supra p60. 
479 TOULET , supra note 356, at 58. 
480 Soc. 3.7.1990, D. 1991. 507 (2e esp.), note Mouly. 
 63 
 
a. The Concept of Fraud in the United States 
 
Relief is available to a party who has given his assent to a contract, based on a 
fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation. 481 In order to prove fraud, several elements must be 
present beside the existence of a misrepresentation. First, the misrepresentation must have 
been either fraudulent or material.482 Second, the misrepresentation must have induced the 
party victim of the fraud to contract. 483 Third, this party must have been justified in relying on 
the misrepresentation. 484 Thus, it is not enough that the assertion is false; the misleading party 
must have the intent to deceive. 485 
With respect to the use of electronic agents, if the person in charge of programming 
uses deceitful tactics knowing that the responding party will give his assent based on these 
tactics, there seems to be a classical case of fraud.486 Indeed, all the elements necessary to 
constitute fraud would be present. There is a misrepresentation with the purpose of inducing 
the other party to give his assent. The programming party acts with knowledge and the 
responding party is justified in relying on the misrepresentation. If the responding party is an 
electronic agent, the same conclusion can be reached. The responding electronic agent is 
programmed to respond to a certain type of messages and therefore it would act within its 
range of actions by sending a manifestation of assent.487 
The remaining question is whether fraud can be proved if the misrepresentation has 
been made by the electronic agent itself, the programming party having not engaged in the 
fraud himself. In such a scenario, the parties would realize there has been a transmission error 
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that has resulted in a misrepresentation. The intent or knowledge cannot be attributed to the 
computer. Thus, the main problem would be for the claiming party to prove that the sending 
party had the intent to mislead him in order to contract, which would be difficult if the 
mistake generated from the computer without the programmer’s knowledge 488  
Moreover, we have said that the reliance on the misrepresentation must be 
justifiable.489 Hence, the question is whether it is reasonable to rely on unread transmissions 
from an electronic agent. This question is actually similar to the one raised under the doctrine 
of mistake. Should the parties who choose to contract through electronic agents bear the risk 
of malfunction of their electronic agents? The standard of the reasonable person may be used 
here.490 Would a reasonable person be aware of the possibility of errors? If so, reliance on the 
representation made by an electronic agent without human review would not be justifiable. 491 
Nonetheless, since contracts can be made by electronic agents without any human review, 492 
the possibility of avoiding such a contract so easily does not seem appropriate. People are 
likely not to use electronic agents if they cannot rely on the resulting contracts. Furthermore, 
the sophistication of the parties may vary significantly and should be taken into account in 
evaluating whether reliance was reasonable. Two professionals who use electronic agents are 
more likely to know the risks of their devices’ use. On the other hand, when an individual is 
purchasing something on the Internet using an electronic agent, he may not have extensive (or 
even reasonable) knowledge of the electronic agent’s features and mechanism. Thus, the 
reasonable person standard does not appear to be adequate.  
Therefore, as long as the misrepresentation has been the result of the sending party, the 
traditional doctrine of fraud may apply. However, if the sending party did not engage any 
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improper conduct, fraud does not seem to provide any relief for agreements formed by 
electronic agents. 
 
b. The Doctrine of Dol in France 
 
The Civil Code provides that “[d]ol is a cause of nullity of the agreement when the 
artifices practiced by one party are such that is evident that without those artifices the other 
party would not have contracted.”493 Three conditions are necessary in order for dol to be 
proven. First, there must have been artifices, that is, some kind of misrepresentation. One of 
the parties must have either lied or omitted to say something,494 and the misrepresentation 
must have been made with the intent to deceive.495 Second, dol must have been led to the 
conclusion of the contract. In other words, without the misrepresentation, the misleading party 
would not have given his assent.496 Finally, dol must have come from one of the parties. 497 If 
a third-party is responsible for the misrepresentation, the party- victim may not avoid the 
contract based on dol. However, if the third party is the agent of one of the parties, the rule 
does not apply to him. 498 
Thus, whether examining French or U.S. laws, one can make similar remarks. If one 
seeks to obtain relief under dol, he will have to show the intent to deceive. In a scenario where 
one party programs the agent to send misleading representations, it seems to be a classical 
case of dol. However, if the electronic agent is responsible for the transmission error, the 
party alleging dol would have to prove the intent and would face the same obstacles as one 
claiming fraud under American law. Moreover, the fact that French law requires the dol to be 
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the act of one of the parties may be a problem if electronic agents are not given the status of 
agents. 499 Therefore, the French theory of dol does not appear to provide relief for contracts 
concluded through electronic agents. 
 
C. Consumers: Should They Get Better Protection? 
 
We have talked earlier about the sophistication (or lack of sophistication) of the parties 
to a contract concluded by electronic agents. With the development of the Internet, people are 
often led to use tools which they do not understand fully. It is hard to believe that one may be 
bound by terms he had no opportunity to read. On the other hand, since an electronic agent 
cannot act without instructions from its user, one could argue that the user actually defines for 
himself the terms of the contract he wishes to enter into. This scenario may be true in the near 
future. However, as has been stated above, with existing technology, electronic agents are 
mainly programmed to make choices based on price and quality. What is the solution if, for  
example, an agent concludes a contract which excludes all warranties? The approach may be 
different under French or U.S. laws. European law, and particularly French law, is very 
protective of consumers’ interests. 500 For instance, in France, if a contract is concluded 
between a professional and an individual, the professional will have to respect several rules. 
For example, a professional who wants to put a limitation of liability in the contract will have 
to inform the consumer. 501 In addition, the Civil Code provides that “[t]he seller is required to 
explain clearly that to which he obligates himself. Any obscure or ambiguous clause is 
interpreted against the seller.”502 Thus, courts are likely to hold in favor of the consumer, if it 
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appears than the latter did not have the opportunity to read and understand his obligations and 
rights.  
However, things may be different under U.S. law. The UCITA states that a person 
“has an opportunity to review a record or term only if the record or term is made available in a 
manner that ought to call it to the attention of a reasonable person and permit review.”503 On 
the other hand, an electronic agent “has an opportunity to review a record or term only if the 
record or term is made available in manner that would enable a reasonably configured 
electronic agent to react to the record or term.” 504 The redaction of the UCITA seems to mean 
that if the electronic agent has the opportunity to review the terms of the contract, the party 
cannot claim he did have the chance to read them. After all, the electronic agent has power to 
conclude a contract on behalf of the user. In addition, the Act refers to “a reasonably 
configured electronic agent.” Even for experts, 505 “[i]t is unclear […] what is meant by a 
manner in which the agent could not react. The abilities of a typical software agent to 
understand and react will be limited more by the effort expanded by its creator than the state 
of the art.”506 Although the U.C.I.T.A. has not been enacted in many states, Article 2 of the 
UCC allows warranties to be disclaimed, even against consumers, so long as the disclaimer is 
clear and conspicuous.507 (The U.C.I.T.A. also provides that a disclaimer good under Article 2 
or Article 2A is effective for the U.C.I.T.A.).508  However, if the disclaimer is blocked by 
some consumer law (e.g., a state or federal consumer protection law), nothing in the UCITA 
(or Article 2 or 2A) should interfere with such a block.509 
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The adequate solutions are perhaps better found in technology than law. 510 For 
instance, if the agent does not find an offer meeting the requirements of its user, it could just 
provide the user with a list of offers similar to the first one and wait for further instructions. 511 
In addition, electronic agents could be developed that are programmed to meet a certain 
degree of sophistication and to accept contracts only with terms and conditions specified by 
the user. Consumer agents could, for example, be programmed only to accept contracts that 
have certain warranty characteristics. They could also be programmed to keep a record of the 
instructions in order to be used as evidence in the event of litigation.512  
 
D. Third Parties’ Responsibility and Viruses 
 
One important debate among the drafters of the UCITA was responsibility in the event 
of a virus. 513 A virus may be defined as “any instruction to a computer that materially 
disrupts, damages, or destroys information, or inappropriately interferes with the use of a 
computer or communications facility, without the consent or permission of the owner and in a 
manner not otherwise authorized.”514 Criminal law makes a party responsible for willfully 
introducing a virus to someone else’s computer.515 This remedy may be appropriate if the 
person responsible for the virus is one of the parties or at least someone whose identity is 
known or may be found by the parties to a contract. However, it is not always easy to find the 
identity of a misfeasor in cyberspace. In the context of contracting, would a party be able to 
avoid a contract because of an unknown misfeasor? What if one of the parties did not have an 
anti-virus program on his computer? Should it be seen as an assumption of risk? There is no 
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case law yet on how to allocate the risk of viruses.516 In such a scenario, it would seem fair to 
be sure that the innocent and cautious party does not have to pay the consequences of the 
somehow negligent behavior of the other party. On the other hand, even with anti- virus 
programs, it is difficult to say that cyberspace is always a safe place and that people who are 
willing to contract online are aware of the risks. Once again, the question is mainly one of 
circumstances and it is difficult to foresee what the courts could decide in this type of cases. 
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CHAPTER 5. 
CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this analysis was to study the formation of contracts concluded by 
electronic agents both in Europe and the United States. It has been shown that traditional rules 
may be inadequate for this new category of contracts. Some progress has been made recently, 
especially in the United States with the adoption of different important texts. However, the 
new Acts do not provide enough substantive law and often leave us with questions as to the 
remedies available to the parties. Thus, to ensure that the use of electronic agents is attractive 
for users, a set of specific laws should  be enacted. We have  discussed  the possible legal status 
to give to electronic agents and the difficulties that arise from applying an existing theory to a 
new tool. In choosing the best solution, drafters and legislatures in general will have to keep 
in mind the realities of business. Electronic agents are used because they are convenient and 
allow their users to save money and time. By placing an unjustified burden on one party, laws 
may discourage people from contracting through electronic agents. On the other hand, if no 
safe environment can be created, users may not rely on electronic agents. The question is one 
of balance. Perhaps this is the reason why legislatures struggle to find adequate solutions. Or 
as some argue, cyberspace law should not be viewed as a distinct body of legal doctrine and 
there is nothing that existing principles cannot solve. In light of our analysis, this approach 
appears doubtful. If a new set of rules is not created, at least a revision of the exis ting ones 
seems necessary. This is an opinion that the legislatures apparently share since several 
changes have been made both in the United States and in Europe recently (notably with the 
revision of Article 2 of the UCC and the European Directive on Electronic Commerce). 
Technology is in constant evolution and the possibilities offered by electronic agents 
today are far from the ones that could be developed tomorrow. Thus, law faces a permanent 
 71 
challenge to adapt itself to these changes. Alternatively the solution may not be in the law but 
in the technology itself. If electronic agents offered a wider range of services, such as choices 
based on different criteria and the possibility to define in advance the terms and provisions of 
the contract, a lot of issues that are faced today may not be relevant anymore.  
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